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"Suffer the Little Children": An Analysis
of Serious Physical Injury Under
Pennsylvania's Child Protective Services
Law
I. Introduction
In September 1981, Dr. William Baxter1 examined two year-old
Randy Dixon. In light of the child's injuries,2 Dr. Baxter reported3
his suspicion that Randy had been abused.4 Dr. Baxter subsequently
submitted the following medical statement to the county child pro-
tective service (CPS) 5 responsible for investigating the abuse report:
Examination of the child revealed a large bruised area measur-
ing approximately 3-4 inches by 9-10 inches extending from the
lower margin of the right rib cage over the right back area to
the right buttock. This area contained two distinct overlapping
bruised areas; one area 72-96 hours of age and a second area of
24-48 hours of age. These bruises appeared to have been in-
flicted by a flat hard object applied with considerable force. My
conclusion following the history and examination was that these
injuries represented evidence of child abuse.'
On the basis of the physician's statement and the results of its inves-
1. The physician's name, and the names of the other individuals involved, are ficti-
tious. All other elements.of this account are true.
2. Dr. Baxter's examination revealed a "large bruised area with, marginal hemor-
rhagic areas extending from immediately below rib cage posteriorly over upper 1h of right
buttock." Appeal of R.D. (State Department of Public Welfare; Office of Hearings and Ap-
peals) (1984), (Unpublished Hearing Officer's Opinion) [hereinafter cited as Appeal of R.D.].
3. Section 4 of the Child Protective Services Law (CPSL), Act of November 26,
1975, Act No. 1975-124, 1975 PA. LAWS 438 (codified as amended at PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11,
§§ 2201 to 2224 (Purdon Supp. 1984)), requires that physicians and certain other profession-
als report any incident of suspected child abuse. Id. at § 2204. These "mandated reporters"
must report to Childline, the toll-free, twenty-four hour telephone hotline established by the
CPSL to receive reports of suspected child abuse. See id. at § 2206(a). See also infra note 57.
4. The CPSL defines "child abuse" as nonaccidental serious physical or mental injury,
sexual abuse or exploitation, or serious physical neglect. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 2203 (Pur-
don Supp. 1984). For the entire definition see infra note 62.
5. Section 16 of the CPSL requires that each county child welfare agency establish a
"child protective service" (CPS) within each agency. Id. at § 2216. The CPS is a specialized
staff responsible for receiving and investigating reports of suspected child abuse, and for pro-
viding services to abused children and their families. See infra note 55 and accompanying text.
6. Appeal of R.D., supra note 2 (emphasis added).
tigation, the CPS filed an indicated report 7 of child abuse, naming
Mr. Dixon-Randy's natural father-and Mrs. Crobsy-Randy's
natural mother-as the alleged perpetrators.8
Thereafter, Dixon requested that the Secretary of Public Wel-
fare expunge9 the report.'0 The Secretary denied the request," and
Dixon appealed.12 At the hearing on the appeal, Dixon averred that
Randy sustained the injuries when he fell down the stairs. The Hear-
ing Officer recommended expungement, ruling that without medical
testimony to refute the possibility that the injuries occurred as Dixon
alleged' 3 the report was inaccurate. The Hearing Officer also as-
serted that "even if the . . . alleged perpetrators had struck [the
child] with a paddle or some other flat hard object, absolutely no
testimony or evidence was presented to show that the injury resulted
in severe pain or impaired [the child's] physical functioning in any
way . . . [which are] the criteria for Child Abuse as defined by the
Child Protective Services Law."' 4
7. The CPS determines whether a particular report is "founded," "indicated," or "un-
founded." A report is "founded" if there is a judicial adjudication that the child was abused. A
report is "indicated" if the CPS finds substantial evidence of abuse based on the available
medical evidence, the CPS investigation, or an admission of the abusive acts by the perpetra-
tor. An "unfounded report is one that is neither founded nor indicated. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11,
§ 2203 (Purdon Supp. 1984).
8. "Perpetrator" refers to the person whose act or omission caused the abuse. See
Children, Youth and Families Manual, Proposed Regulations § 3490.4, to be codified at 55 PA.
ADMIN. CODE §§ 3490.1 to 3490.107 (19-_).
9. " 'Expunge' means to strike out or obliterate entirely so that the expunged informa-
tion may not be stored, identified, or later recovered by any means mechanical, electronic, or
otherwise." PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 2203 (Purdon Supp. 1984).
10. When the CPS determines that a report is indicated or founded, the information
concerning the report is expunged from the pending complaint file, and is entered into the
statewide central register. Id. at § 2214(h). All identifying information is maintained in the
central register until the child who was the subject of the report reaches eighteen years of age.
Id. at § 2214(n). Pursuant to Section 15(d) of the CPSL, a subject of a report - i.e., the child
allegedly abused, or his parent, guardian, or other person legally responsible for the child's
welfare who is named in the report - may at any time request that the Secretary of Public
Welfare amend, seal, or expunge the information contained in the central register on grounds
that it is inaccurate or is being maintained in a manner inconsistent with the law. Id. at §
2215(d).
11. The Secretary of Public Welfare has designated the DPW Office of Children,
Youth and Families' (CYF) Protective Service Program as the reviewing office for these re-
quests. Interview with Joseph Spear, Child Welfare Specialist, CYF, in Harrisburg, PA (Nov.
9, 1984) [hereinafter cited as Spear Interview].
12. Section 15(d) of the CPSL also provides a right of appeal from the Secretary's
decision on the request. Any subject of a report, or the CPS, may file an appeal with the
Secretary of Public Welfare within forty-five days of the CYF decision. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11,
§ 2215(d) (Purdon Supp. 1984). The subsequent hearing is held pursuant to the Administra-
tive Agency Law, 2 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 702 (Purdon Supp. 1983).
13. The Hearing Officer apparently saw no contradiction between the father's testi-
mony and the physician's observations of bruised areas of different ages, i.e., one area 3-4 days
old and a second area 1-2 days old. Appeal of R.D., supra note 2. Dixon claimed that the child
was playing in a hallway and "slid down on his little behind to the bottom. When he stood up,
he had lost his balance and fell back against the steps." Id.
14. Id. DPW regulations establish four criteria which govern whether an injury is "se-
rious physical injury" under the CPSL. For further clarification, see infra notes 125-26 and
accompanying text.
Some authorities candidly admit that this decision troubles
them, and that a different Hearing Officer may well have reached a
contrary conclusion. 5 They attribute their concern not only to this
case, but also to the recognition that the ill-defined parameters of
"serious physical injury" encourage confusion and inconsistency.
This comment will examine the development of Pennsylvania's Child
Protective Services Law, explore its theoretical and practical limita-
tions, and recommend a more precise definition.
II. The Movement to Protect Children
A. Historical Perspective
Throughout history, children have suffered indignities, torture,
and death at the hands of their parents, caretakers, and other adults
upon whom they relied for nurture. Such treatment "was justified
for many centuries by the belief that severe physical punishment was
necessary to either maintain discipline, to transmit educational ideas,
to please certain gods, or to expel evil spirits."' 6 Although some indi-
viduals condemned these practices,'" no organized response to the
problem arose until the late nineteenth century. 8 That era witnessed
the founding in 1875 of the New York Society for the Prevention of
Cruelty to Children (SPCC), 19 and in 1877, the Philadelphia Society
15. Interview with Patricia O'Neal, Director, DPW Office of Hearings and Appeals, in
Harrisburg, PA (Jan. 18, 1985) [hereinafter cited as O'Neal Interview]. Spear Interview,
supra note 1I. Both O'Neal and Spear agree that the undefined term "serious physical injury"
and the DPW definition contribute to arbitrary decisions. Compare Appeal of R.D. with Ap-
peal of B.S. (State Department of Public Welfare; Office of Hearings and Appeals) (1984),
(Unpublished Hearing Officer's Opinion), in which examination of the child (age undisclosed)
revealed six or seven bruises on her right hip and thigh. The largest bruise measured approxi-
mately two inches in diameter; the others were estimated at one inch in diameter. B.S., the
child's mother, admitted hitting her with a belt to discipline her for lying, but denied causing
the injuries. Relying on the child's complaint of pain on her right side to support the finding,
the Hearing Officer ruled that the injuries were serious. See also infra notes 136-38 and ac-
companying text. Thus, it appears that the child who is unable to articulate whether she suf-
fered "severe pain" - or any level of pain - is disadvantaged under the DPW criterion. See
supra note 126 and accompanying text.
16. Radbill, A History of Child Abuse and Infanticide, in THE BATTERED CHILD 3 (R.
Heifer & C. Kempe eds. 1968).
17. Henry VI, Plato, Plutarch, and L'Estrange all decried their societies' abuse and
maltreatment of children. Radbill, supra note 17, at 10.
18. See, e.g., Thomas, Child Abuse and Neglect: Part I, Historical Overview, Legal
Matrix and Social Perspectives, 50 N.C.L. REv. 249 (1972). See also Radbill, supra note 17,
at 12.
19. The catalyst behind its creation was the "Mary Ellen" case. In the absence of legal
authority to remove eleven year-old Mary Ellen from the adoptive parents who had regularly
beaten and neglected her, interested church workers turned to the Society for the Prevention of
Cruelty to Animals (SPCA). On the premise that, as a member of the animal kingdom, Mary
Ellen was entitled to protection under the laws proscribing cruelty to animals, the SPCA effec-
tuated Mary Ellen's removal from her parents. See Fontana, The Maltreatment Syndrome in
Children, in THE MALTREATED CHILD 8 (V. Fontana & D. Besharov eds. 1964). See also
Shepherd, The Abused Child and the Law, 22 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 182, 184 (1965). For a
recent discussion of the similarities between child abuse statutes and cruelty to animal stat-
utes, see People v. Allen, - Colo. - , 657 P.2d 447 (1983).
to Protect Children from Cruelty.2" By 1922, 59 chapters of the
SPCC and 307 human societies were providing services to abused
and neglected children. 2 The concurrent development of juvenile
court systems and public social service agencies fostered an increased
awareness of the state's responsibility for the protection of
children.22
Despite these efforts, the plight of abused and neglected chil-
dren garnered little public attention until the American Academy of
Pediatrics sponsored a symposium on child abuse in 1961.23 Under
the direction of Dr. C. Henry Kempe, the symposium focused on the
woeful lack of proper identification and treatment of the "battered
child." Kempe and his associates proposed the term "battered child
syndrome" for the "clinical condition in young children who have
received serious physical injury. '  The descriptive name derived
from the types of injuries Kempe observed, including fractures, deep
body injury, burns, abrasions, bruises, hematomas, and "all other
bodily injuries generally resulting from battering a child." 25 Kempe's
group found that many of these battered children were examined by
physicians who either failed to diagnose the condition or failed to
advise the proper authorities when they correctly identified it. As a
result, some children were subjected to further abuse and
mistreatment.26
Two years later, Kempe and his colleagues successfully peti-
tioned the Children's Bureau of the Department of Health, Educa-
tion and Welfare to draft a model statute27 requiring physicians to
report all children who exhibited serious physical injuries inflicted
nonaccidentally.28 Within four years, the legislatures of all fifty
states enacted child abuse reporting laws similar to the federal
proposal.29
20. Radbill, supra note 17, at 13.
21. S. O'BRIEN, CHILD ABUSE, A CRYING SHAME 7 (1980).
22. R. HOROWITZ & H. DAVIDSON, LEGAL RIGHTS OF CHILDREN 264 (1984). The
doctrine of "parens patriae" (the power of the state to act in loco parentis to protect children
and their property interests) and "best interest of the child' are legal concepts which form the
underpinnings for the state's power to intervene on behalf of its children. Id.
23. S. O'BRIEN, supra note 22, at 7.
24. Kempe, Silverman, Steele, Droegmuller, & Silver, The Battered Child Syndrome,
181 J. A.M.A. 17, 22 (1962) [hereinafter cited as Kempe & Silverman].
25. Fontana, The Maltreated Children of Our Times, 23 VILL. L. REV. 448 (1977-
1978).
26. Kempe & Silverman, supra note 25, at 17.
27. CHILDREN'S BUREAU, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, EDUCATION AND WELFARE,
THE ABUSED CHILD - PRINCIPLES AND SUGGESTED LANGUAGE FOR LEGISLATION AND RE-
PORTING OF THE PHYSICALLY ABUSED CHILD (1963).
28. Besharov, Child Protection: Past Progress, Present Problems and Future Direc-
tions, 17 FAM. L.Q. 151, 153 (1983) [hereinafter cited as Besharov, Child Protection].
29. Id. at 153-54. "As suggested by the Children's Bureau, the majority of child abuse
statutes [in 1973] require reporting of 'serious physical injury or injuries inflicted upon [the
child] other than by accidental means by a parent or other person responsible for his care.' "
Kempe's formulation scan came under critical review. At the
New York Foundling Hospital Center for Parent and Child Develop-
ment, Dr. Vincent Fontana and his associates observed children who
exhibited signs of abuse and neglect, but did not fit Kempe's clinical
picture of the battered child.30 Rejecting the "battered child syn-
drome" as narrow and underinclusive, 1 Fontana's group suggested
the term "maltreatment syndrome" to describe "the greater whole
picture of child abuse, ranging from the simple-the undernourished
infant categorized as a 'failure to thrive'-to the battered child, oft-
entimes the last phase of the spectrum."32
The distinction between the Kempe and the Fontana approaches
heralded the current tension between proponents of broad definitions
of child abuse, and advocates of narrow formulations.33 Since the
statutory definition of child abuse delineates not only the circum-
stances which require a report, but also the agency's jurisdiction and
ability to provide protective services,34 the problem of adequately de-
fining abuse is "no doubt the most controversial issue in child protec-
tive theory, if not practice."3 "
B. The Pennsylvania Response
1. Precursors of the Child Protective Services
Law.-Pennsylvania's legislature initially attempted to protect
abused children by enacting laws which proscribed cruel treatment,
abuse, unnecessary cruel punishment, and willful abandonment.3 6
These laws established criminal penalties for child abusers but failed
to provide rehabilitative services for either parents or children. 37 In
fact, their emphasis on the criminal nature of the caretaker's con-
Brown, Child Abuse: Attempts to Solve the Problem by Reporting Laws, 60 WOMEN L.J. 73,
75 (1974). See generally Daly, Willful Child Abuse and State Reporting Statutes, 23 U.
MIAMI L. REV. 283 (1969); Paulsen, Child Abuse Reporting Laws: The Shape of the Legisla-
tion, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1967); Paulsen, Parker & Lynn, Child Abuse Reporting Laws -
Some Legislative History, 34 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 482 (1966).
30. Fontana, supra note 26.
31. W. WADLINGTON, C. WHITEBREAD, & J. DAVID, CASES & MATERIALS ON CHIL-
DREN IN THE LEGAL SYSTEM 765 (1983) [hereinafter cited as WADLINGTON & WHITEBREAD].
32. Fontana, supra note 26 at 448-49.
33. But see WADLINGTON & WHITEBREAD, supra note 32, at 766 ("The recent ten-
dency has been to broaden the definition of child abuse as a medical phenomenon, which in
turn has resulted in a broadening of its definition in reporting statutes, criminal statutes, juve-
nile court statutes, and for other purposes under the law.").
34. Besharov, The Legal Aspects of Reporting Known & Suspected Child Abuse &
Neglect, 23 VILL. L. REV. 458, 474 (1977-1978) [hereinafter cited as Besharov, Legal Aspects
of Reporting].
35. Id.
36. Act of June 11, 1879, Act. No. 1879-151, 1879 PA. LAWS 142. Violation of the
statute constituted a misdemeanor. See also Act of June 24, 1939, Act No. 1939-375, 1939
PA. LAWS 872, making cruelty to minors a misdemeanor punishable by fine not exceeding
$3,000 or imprisonment for term not to exceed 4 years or both.
37. See id.
duct frequently precluded maintenance of the family unit."
Attention generated by the work of Kempe and Fontana
prompted the General Assembly to pass Pennsylvania's first "Child
Abuse Law" in 1967." The legislation required physicians to report
instances of nonaccidental gross physical neglect or injury to the ap-
propriate county child welfare agency.40 The Act empowered the
agency to investigate reports of suspected abuse and to provide "pro-
tective services" in order to guard the child against further injury
and to preserve the family when possible.4 Physicians required to
report were termed "mandated reporters" and were guaranteed im-
munity from liability for making a good faith report in compliance
with the law.' 2 Finally, the law specifically abrogated the traditional
physician-patient privilege, thereby allowing mandated reporters to
divulge information obtained from examination of, or contact with,
suspected child abuse victims.4 3
In 1970, the legislature amended the 1967 law to include teach-
ers and school nurses as mandated reporters."' New language also
allowed any adult who suspected that a child was "suffering from
gross physical neglect or intentionally caused serious injury" to make
a report."5 The amendment extended to all reporters the immunity
from liability enjoyed by physicians under the 1967 Act."6 Finally,
the amendment required the county child welfare agencies to notify
appropriate law enforcement officials upon receiving a report of sus-
pected child abuse.' 7
In 1973, State Senator Michael O'Pake introduced legislation to
encourage more comprehensive reporting of child abuse, facilitate in-
vestigation, and establish a statewide registry of reported cases.'" His
crusade culminated in 1975 in the enactment of Pennsylvania's
38. See, e.g., Daly, supra note 30.
39. Act of Aug. 14, 1967, Act No. 1967-91, 1967 PA. LAWS 239.
40.
Any physician, whose examination of a child less than eighteen years of age
discloses evidence of gross physical neglect or injury not explained by the availa-
ble medical evidence history as being accidental in nature, or suffering from any
wound or other injury inflicted by his own act or by the act of another by means
of a knife, gun, pistol or other deadly weapon, shall immediately report in accor-
dance with the provisions of this act.
Id. at section 3.
41. Counseling and homemaker services are two examples of "protective services." See
BUREAU OF CHILD WELFARE, STATE DEPT. OF PUBLIC WELFARE, 1976 CHILD ABUSE REPORT
5 [hereinafter cited as 1976 REPORT]. Id. at § 3.
42. Act of Aug. 14, 1967, Act No. 1967-91 § 5, 1967 PA. LAWS 239.
43. Id. at § 3.
44. Act of December 30, 1970, Act No. 1970-299 § 3, 1970 PA. LAWS 951.
45. Id. Curiously, this language, qualifying the injury as serious, set a more stringent
standard than the nonaccidental "gross neglect or injury" standard under which mandated
reporters were required to report.
46. Id. at § 7.
47. Id. at § 5. But see infra note 67 and accompanying text.
48. 1976 REPORT, supra note 41.
Child Protective Services Law (CPSL).49
2. Pennsylvania's Current Reporting Law.-The Child Protec-
tive Services Law drew its first breath on November 26, 1975. It was
not an easy birth. Initially introduced as Senate Bill 1166 in 1973,50
the Act underwent major revisions in the House of Representatives
prior to its enactment and its approval by the Governor.51 Of the
many House changes, none proved as critical as the revised definition
of child abuse, which narrowed the scope of the law to serious physi-
cal injuries.5 2 The House version also incorporated an "environmen-
tal exception," which precludes a finding of physical or mental abuse
based "solely on the grounds of environmental factors which are be-
yond the control of the person responsible for the child's welfare
such as inadequate housing, furnishings, income, clothing and medi-
cal care."'53
To encourage comprehensive reporting of suspected child abuse
and to protect abused children from additional harm, the Act re-
quired each County to establish a "child protective service" (CPS)."'
49. Act of November 26, 1975, Act No. 1975-124, 1975 PA. LAWS 438 codified as
amended at PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, §§ 2201 to 2224 (Purdon Supp. 1984)). The Act "was
considered a prototype in the United States." S. O'BRIEN, supra note 22, at 8. For a discussion
of the law as initially enacted, see Note, The Pennsylvania Child Protective Services Law, 81
DICK. L. REV. 823 (1977).
50. State Senator Michael O'Pake sponsored the legislation. See 1976 REPORT, supra
note 42 and accompanying text. A unanimous Senate passed it on April 22, 1974. From April
23 to September 30, the bill remained in the House Committee on Health and Welfare. It
reached the House floor for second consideration on October 2, 1974. HISTORY OF SENATE
BILLS 151 (1973-1974). Governor Milton Shapp vetoed Senate Bill 1166 on December 30,
1974. Although he acknowledged the need for such legislation, Shapp saw the act as constitu-
tionally flawed because, among other things, it failed to "require a due process hearing either
before or after a child is taken into protective custody." 1974 PA. LAWS, 1570, Veto No. 52.
Compare PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 2208 (Purdon Supp. 1984), which provides that within 24
hours after a child is taken into protective custody, a court order must be obtained and the
parent or guardian must be notified. Within 72 hours, a detention hearing must be held. If at
the detention hearing it is determined that protective custody should continue, the CPS must
file a petition pursuant to the Juvenile Act, 42 PA. CoNs. STAT. ANN. §§ 6301 to 6365 (Purdon
Supp. 1984).
51. HISTORY OF SENATE BILLS 5 (1975). See also PA. HOUSE JOURNAL, at 2904 (Oct.
2, 1975) (discussion on bill).
52. As finally enacted, the law defined an abused child as:
a child under eighteen years of age [who exhibits evidence of serious physical or
mental injury not explained by the available medical history as being accidental,
sexual abuse, or serious physical neglect] caused by the acts or omissions of the
child's parents or by a person responsible for the child's welfare provided, how-
ever, no child shall be deemed to be physically or mentally abused for the sole
reason he is in good faith being furnished treatment by spiritual means through
prayer alone in accordance with the tenets and practices of a recognized church
or religious denomination by a duly accredited practitioner thereof or solely on
the grounds of environmental factors which are beyond the control of the person
responsible for the child's welfare such as inadequate housing, furnishings, in-
come, clothing and medical care.
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 2203 (Purdon Supp. 1984).
53. Id.
54. Id. at § 2216. Generally, the CPS constitutes a separate, specialized unit within the
The law empowered the CPS to investigate reports of suspected child
abuse and to provide counseling and rehabilitative services to abused
children and their families. 5 Most significantly, the CPSL estab-
lished a toll-free, twenty-four hour hotline, called "Childline," to re-
ceive and process reports statewide. 5 The Act also expanded the list
of mandated reporters,57 and for the first time established penalties
for those who failed to report.58 Finally, the new law chiseled out
exceptions to the traditional rules of evidence by abrogating all privi-
leges except the attorney-client and the minister-penitent
privileges. B
Since 1975, the CPSL has been amended twice.10 The. major
amendment, passed in 1982, revised the definition of child abuse,6
and specifically delineated "sexual abuse." '62 It also provided a rem-
county's child welfare agency. The CPS staff may include a supervisor, several caseworkers, a
homemaker, and a caseworker aide.
55. Id.
56. See id. at § 2214. The Childline program operates under the auspices of the Dep-
uty Secretary of DPW's Office of Children, Youth and Families. Located in Harrisburg, Penn-
sylvania, Childline's staff includes an administrator, an administrative assistant, two supervi-
sors, sixteen counselors, and five clerical workers. OFFICE OF CHILDREN, YOUTH AND FAMILIES,
STATE DEPT. OF PUBLIC WELFARE, 1983 CHILD ABUSE REPORT [hereinafter cited as 1983
REPORT].
57. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 2204(c) (Purdon Supp. 1984).
58. Id. at 2212.
59. Id. at 2222(2).
60. The CPSL was first amended in 1982. See Act of June 10, 1982, Act No. 1982-136
1982 PA. LAWS 460, (codified as amended at PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, §§ 2201 to 2224 (Purdon
Supp. 1984). A second amendment in 1983 served only to amend the definition of "Family or
Household members" added in 1982. The 1982 definition had provided that "family or house-
hold members" meant "spouses, persons living as spouses, parents and children, or other per-
sons related by consanguinity or affinity." The 1983 amendment deleted the phrase "persons
living as spouses." See Act of Oct. 21, 1983, Act No. 1983-42, 1983 PA. LAWS 42 (codified as
amended at PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, §§ 2201 to 2224 (Purdon Supp. 1984). Curiously, the
present act includes "a paramour of the child's parent" as a possible perpetrator. PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 11, § 2203 (Purdon Supp. 1984) (emphasis added).
61. The statute now reads:
"Child abuse" means serious physical or mental injury which is not explained by
the available medical history as being accidental, or sexual abuse or sexual ex-
ploitation, or serious physical neglect, of a child under 18 years of age, if the
injury, abuse or neglect has been caused by the acts or omissions of the child's
parents or by a person responsible for the child's welfare, or any individual resid-
ing in the same home as the child, or a paramour of the child's parents provided,
however, no child shall be deemed to be physically or mentally abused for the
sole reason he is in good faith being furnished treatment by spiritual means
through prayer alone in accordance with the tenets and practices of a recognized
church or religious denomination by a duly accredited practitioner thereof or is
not provided specific medical treatment in the practice of religious beliefs, or
solely on the grounds of environmental factors which are beyond the control of
the person responsible for the child's welfare such as inadequate housing, fur-
nishings, income, clothing and medical care.
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 2203 (Purdon Supp. 1984).
62. Section 2203 defines "sexual abuse" as:
[T]he obscene or pornographic photographing, filming or depiction of children
for 'commercial purposes, or the rape, molestation, incest, prostitution, or other
such forms of sexual exploitation of children under circumstances which indicate
that the child's health or welfare is harmed or threatened thereby, as determined
edy for mandated reporters who are unlawfully discharged or dis-
criminated against as a result of their good faith compliance with
the Act's reporting requirements.6 8 An addition to the "Findings and
Purposes" section reaffirmed the traditional deference accorded pa-
rental rights,"' specifically providing that "nothing in this act shall
be construed to restrict the generally recognized existing rights of
parents to use reasonable supervision and control when raising their
children. ' 65 Finally, the 1982 amendment gave law enforcement offi-
cials access to child abuse records, a major step in facilitating inves-
tigations of sexual abuse, homicides, and cases involving serious bod-
ily injury to children.66
While most of the 1982 amendments attempt to clarify certain
terms and provisions, the inclusion of the parental rights statement
strikes a discordant note in an opus dedicated primarily to the pro-
tection of the child. At the very least, it underscores the competing
interests at stake: the parent's desire for autonomy in his family life,
the child's need for nurturance and protection from abuse, and the
state's duty to provide that nurturance and protection when parents
fail to do so. The CPSL's failure to define serious physical injury
threatens this delicate balancing of interests, and raises more issues
about the application of the law than it resolves.
III. Problems of Definition
A. The Ongoing Debate
Fontana's dissatisfaction with Kempe's "battered child syn-
drome"67 foreshadowed the difficulties in developing an adequate
definition of child abuse. 8 As one commentator suggests, the impor-
tance of precise definitions arises "because they affect the reporter,
the report, the jurisdiction, the quantity and quality of the evidence,
in accordance with regulations prescribed by the secretary.
Id. at § 2203.
63. Id. at § 2204(d).
64. See generally Paulsen, The Legal Framework for Child Protection, 66 COLUM. L.
REV. 679 (1966).
65. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 2202 (Purdon Supp. 1984).
66. Id. at § 2215(a)(9), 2215(a)(10). Many law enforcement officials applaud this ad-
vance. Interview with Michael Eakin, Cumberland County District Attorney, in Carlisle, PA
(Jan. 8, 1985).
67. See supra notes 31-33 and accompanying text. See also Besharov, Legal Aspects of
Reporting, supra note 35, 471-72 ("Although state laws still vary greatly in specifying what
circumstances or conditions must or may be reported, an increasing number of states are going
beyond the special attention that was earlier given to the 'Battered Child Syndrome.' ").
68. See, e.g., Besharov, LEGAL AsPECTS OF REPORTING, supra note 35. Sussman, Re-
porting Child Abuse: A Review of the Literature, 8 FAM. L.Q. 245, 249-50 (1974) ("The word
'abuse' is so pregnant with meaning and so laced with ambiguity that thirty-three states have
foregone any attempt to define it.") For an early discussion on the problem, see Clements,
Child Abuse: The Problem of Definition, 8 CREIGHTON L. REV. 729 (1975).
and the duty of the protective services."6 9 Nevertheless, while many
state statutes define child abuse as physical injury, mental or emo-
tional injury, and sexual molestation, these terms are frequently un-
defined.7 Thus, the debate between proponents of specific defini-
tions, and advocates of less restrictive formulations continues long
after Fontana first protested the limited applicability of Kempe's
proposal."
Although both schools present cogent arguments,7" recent pro-
posals reject the imprecision of earlier definitions. 73 These proposals
typically establish "harm" or "threatened harm" as the threshold re-
quirement for a finding of child abuse. 7 ' However, critics protest the
"residual imprecision '75 in such formulations and suggest limiting
the scope of child abuse laws to cases in which the harm is serious.76
Other authorities rail against the use of this qualifier,77 arguing that
it encourages confusion among reporters, 78 and results in simultane-
69. Katz, Ambrosino, McGrath, & Sawitsky, Legal Research on Child Abuse and
Neglect: Past and Future, It FAM. L.Q. 151 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Katz].
70. Note, Unequal & Inadequate Protection Under the Law: State Child Abuse Stat-
utes, 50 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 243, 253 (1982). Some authorities view this failure as promoting
vague, general statutory language which encourages inappropriate intervention. Accord David-
son, Children's Rights: Emerging Trends for the 1980's, 19 TRIAL 44, 46 (1983). Contra
Paulsen, Child Abuse Reporting Laws: The Shape of the Legislation, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 1,
12 (1967) ("Surely, the terms 'abuse' and 'neglect' are best left undefined. The varieties of
serious abuse are all embraced by statutory language which speaks of physical injuries.").
71. See supra notes 31-33 and accompanying text. Several authorities speculate that
"the definition an individual favors is inextricably linked to his or her professional objectives,
cultural perspectives, and personal attitudes .... In the absence of a clear and widely ac-
cepted definition, these differing objectives naturally color the definitions adopted by individ-
uals and professionals." (emphasis added). Besharov, Legal Aspects of Reporting, supra note
35, at 473. See also Katz, supra note 70, at 166 ("[Any assessment of abuse or neglect must
involve facts and values, physical or emotional acts or impacts, intended and unintended move-
ments. These will vary with the individual and his professional outlook.").
72. Besharov, Legal Aspects of Reporting, supra note 35, at 473.
73. Besharov, Behind Closed Doors, 3 FAM. ADVOCATE 3, 30 (1980) [hereinafter cited
as Besharov, Behind Closed Doors].
74. Id. See also infra notes 86, 89 and accompanying text.
75. Besharov, Behind Closed Doors, supra note 74, at 30.
76. Id. See also supra notes 17-18 and accompanying text.
77. See, e.g., Bourne & Newberger, "Family Autonomy" or "Coercive Intervention"?
Ambiguity and Conflict in the Proposed Standards for Child Abuse and Neglect, 57 B.U.L.
REV. 670 (1977); Daly, supra note 30; McCoid, The Battered Child and Other Assaults upon
the Family, 50 MINN. L. REV. 1 (1965). But see Hansen, Child Abuse Legislation and the
Interdisciplinary Approach, 52 A.B.A. J. 734, 734-35 (1966) ("The words 'willful, unreasona-
ble, severe, unusual' before 'physical injury' preclude reports by neighborhood cranks of well-
deserved spankings administered by sane, responsible parents in the normal course of
discipline.").
78. Besharov, Child Protection supra note 29, at 161-63. Some mandated reporters
have admitted their confusion as to the degree of harm necessary to reach the level of "seri-
ous" injury. (Comment author's personal experience as a General Protective Service
caseworker, 1976-1983). For more information on the provisions of general protective services,
see 55 PA. ADMIN. CODE § 3480.1-3480.17 (1984). See also Besharov, Behind Closed Doors,
supra note 74, at 30 in which the author notes that in states which required reporting of
"serious" injuries, many professionals "claimed that a child's injury was not 'serious' and used
that claim as an excuse for not reporting situations."
ously high incidences of overreporting and underreporting." Addi-
tionally, use of "serious" ignores the benefits of early identification
and intervention before the child sustains a life-threatening injury.80
Discretionary application of the "serious physical injury" language
provides further cause for concern.81 As one authority argues:
[A]n injury that one person may consider serious, another per-
son may consider minor. Consequently, efforts to narrow the
concept of child maltreatment by adding the one-word qualifier
of "serious" are at best a partial solution to a more fundamental
problem, and, at worst, a cosmetic change that gives the illusion
of greater specificity while in reality merely substituting one im-
precise term for another.82
The following examples represent varying approaches to the
problem of adequately defining child abuse. The discussion focuses
on the level of harm sufficient to be considered abuse.
1. Federal Proposal.-One January 31, 1974, President Nixon
signed the Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act in law.8" The
Act created the National Center on Child Abuse and Neglect, a na-
tional clearinghouse for information and programs, and allocated
federal funds to assist states in establishing child abuse programs.
The Act also developed guidelines for states to follow in implement-
ing reporting laws and child protective services. 8' In its current form,
the Act treats abuse and neglect as a unitary concept and provides
that "child abuse and neglect" is "the physical or mental injury, sex-
ual abuse or exploitation, negligent treatment, or maltreatment of a
child under the age of eighteen . . . by a person . . . responsible for
the child's welfare under circumstances that indicate that the child's
79. Besharov, Child Protection supra note 29, at 162-63. (U.S. Center on Child Abuse
and Neglect's National Study of the Incidence and Severity of Child Abuse and Neglect sug-
gests that overreporting and underreporting - often by same individuals - results from wide-
spread confusion about what should and should not be reported).
80. McCoid, supra note 78, at 50-51. ("The language of 'serious physical injury' .
as contrasted with 'physical injury' or 'wound or injury' may be undesirable. The early identifi-
cation of the pattern of abuse may mean an early and effective breaking of that pattern forever
• ..[allowing] some prophylactic measures [to] be taken before serious injury occurs." Ac-
cord Paulsen, supra note 71, at 12. ("Whether the limitation [to serious injuries] is wise may
be questioned in the light of respectable opinion supporting the view that the minor injury
growing out of the family pathology should not be disregarded." Paulsen admits, however, that
limited state resources and family privacy rights may justify the limitation.).
81. See Daly, supra note 30, at 318. Besharov, Behind Closed Doors, supra note 74, at
30. See also infra note 127 and accompanying text.
82. Besharov, Behind Closed Doors, supra note 74, at 30.
83. Act of Jan. 31, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-247, 88 Stat. 4 (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. §§ 5101-5115 (1982).
84. See generally Fraser, A Glance at the Past. A Gaze at the Present, A Glimpse at
the Future. A Critical Analysis of the Development of Child Abuse Reporting Statutes, 54
CHI. KENT L. REV. 641, 648 (1978).
health or welfare is harmed or threatened thereby."85
Under this approach, protection takes on a preventative hue,
with the threat of harm sufficient to trigger intervention. Moreover,
the child's injury need not rise to the level of "serious." However, a
proviso requiring that the child's welfare be harmed or threatened
with harm eliminates inconsequential injuries from the purview of
the Act.86
2. Federal Standards (Draft).-In 1978, the Federal Advisory
Board on Child Abuse and Neglect and the National Center on
Child Abuse and Neglect jointly issued recommendations and stan-
dards for child abuse programs.8 The draft's definition of abuse mir-
rors that of the Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act in sev-
eral respects.88 First, the draft suggests that "a single conceptual
framework" be utilized in defining abuse and neglect.89 Accordingly,
the proposal refers to the "abused or neglected" child. Second, it
encompasses the threat of harm, as well as actual harm, in establish-
ing the appropriate point for intervention. Third, and most impor-
tant, the proposal omits the term "serious" preceding "injury," an
omission the drafters expressly endorse:
It is impossible to legislate all the gradations of concern, 90 espe-
cially since "non-serious" injuries, if unreported, may lead to
"serious injuries". "Serious" can mean anything from a slight
bruise to death; its ultimate meaning depends on the circum-
85. 42 U.S.C. § 5101 (1982). Pennsylvania's noncompliance with the "harm or
threatened thereby" language bars its participation in the program. Spear Interview, supra
note iI.
86. The regulations promulgated pursuant to the Act provide in part that harm or
threatened harm to a child's welfare "can occur through: Non-accidental physical or mental
injury; sexual abuse, as defined by State law; or negligent treatment or maltreatment, includ-
ing the failure to provide adequate food, clothing or shelter." 45 C.FR. § 1340.1, 2 (1982).
87. FEDERAL ADVISORY BD. ON CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT & THE NAT'L CENTER
ON CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT, FEDERAL STANDARDS FOR CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT PRE-
VENTION AND TREATMENT PROGRAMS AND PROJECTS (DRAFT) (1978) [hereinafter cited as
DRAFT].
88. The draft defines an abused or neglected child as one "whose physical or mental
health or welfare is harmed or threatened with harm by the acts or omissions of his parent or
other person responsible for his welfare." Id. at IIl-5. See also supra note 86 and accompany-
ing text.
89. DRAFT, supra note 88, at I11-5.
90. But see, COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-10-103 (1978), which provides, in pertinent part,
as follows:
(1)(a) "Abuse" or "child abuse or neglect" means an act or omissions in one of
the following categories which seriously threatens the health or welfare of a
child:
(I) Any case in which a child exhibits evidence of skin bruising, bleeding, mal-
nutrition, failure to thrive, burns, fracture of any bone, subdural hematoma, soft
tissue swelling, or death, and such condition or death is not justifiably explained,
or where the history given concerning such condition or death is at variance with
the degree or type of such condition or death, or circumstances indicate that
such condition or death may not be the product of an accidental occurrence.
See also infra note 110 and accompanying text.
stances of the case, including the age of the child (the younger
the child, the more serious the same injury) and the location of
the injury (an injury to the head or the genitalia is ordinarily
more serious than an injury to an extremity). The test should be
whether the child is "harmed" of "threatened with harm."9
The drafters concluded that the "good judgment of those in-
volved" should determine the significance of a child's injury.9" This
is a curious peg on which to hang this responsibility. Most commen-
tators advocating deletion of the term "serious" do so to reduce the
substantial discretion involved in determining what constitutes "seri-
ous injury".93 Experts who view the "harm or threatened with harm"
formulation as a step toward a more precise definition would surely
question the drafter's faith in the subjective "good judgment"
standard.94
3. New York's Approach.-New York's child protective ser-
vices law" recognizes both "abused" and "maltreated" children." It
defines a "maltreated child" as one under eighteen years of age who
is "neglected" within the meaning of the state's Family Court Act, 97
or who "has had serious physical injury inflicted upon him by other
than accidental means." 98 The statute also defines "abused child" by
reference to the Family Court Act's definition. 99 Under that defini-
91. DRAFT, supra note 88, at 111-6-7. The proposal further clarifies the term as follows:
[H]arm includes . . . physical, emotional or mental injury, including physical
injury resulting from otherwise lawful corporal punishment which becomes un-
lawful when it disfigures, impairs, or harms the child's body . . . [T]hreatened
harm [is] a substantial risk of harm including any reasonably foreseeable danger
to a child's physical, mental, or emotional health or welfare . . . [P]hysical in-
jury [is] death, disfigurement, impairment, or other forms of harm to the child's
body.
Id. The commentary notes that threatened harm is established by a "substantial risk test", i.e.,
a strong possibility of harm, as contrasted with a remote possibility. Id. Compare the definition
of substantial risk at infra note 122.
92. DRAFT, supra note 88.
93. See, e.g., Daly, supra note 30, at 318. Accord Besharov, Behind Closed Doors,
supra note 74, at 30 (Imprecision allows individual decisionmakers great latitude in applying
their personal interpretations and values to the childrearing situations they must judge.). Ar-
guably, some amount of discretion is necessary, particularly for the CPS worker. However,
absent definitive guidelines, the caseworker must rely upon a wholly subjective standard, which
may exceed or fall short of the standards of her superiors.
94. See, e.g., Besharov, Behind Closed Doors, supra note 74, at 30.
95. N.Y. SoC. SERv. LAW §§ 411-428 (McKinney 1983). New York's Child Protective
Services Act "mandates the reporting of 'child abuse' and 'child neglect' as defined by the
Family Court Act, and it structures the state's entire child protective system around them."
Besharov, State Intervention to Protect Children. New York's Definitions of "Child Abuse"
and "Child Neglect", 26 N.Y.L. ScH. L. REV. 723, 724 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Besharov,
State Intervention). Significantly, Pennsylvania's Juvenile Act fails to define abused child. See
42 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 6301-6365 (1982).
96. N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW § 412 (McKinney 1983).
97. N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT §§ 1011-1074 (McKinney 1983).
98. N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW § 412 (McKinney 1983).
99. Id.
tion, °00 a child is abused if his parent, or other person legally respon-
sible for his welfare, (1) inflicts or allows to be inflicted on the child,
a non-accidental physical injury which causes or creates a substan-
tial risk of death or serious bodily injury, or (2) creates or allows to
be created a substantial risk of physical injury which would be likely
to cause death or serious bodily injury. 10'
The most salient feature of the New York Statute is its elimina-
tion of the requirement that the child actually sustain a physical in-
jury. Instead, the child is abused if the parent "creates a substantial
risk" of a physical injury which would be likely to cause death or
serious bodily injury. Intervention may be predicated upon an assess-
ment that the parent's future behavior will be harmful to the
child. 102 Additionally, the seriousness of the injury is measured by its
effect or probable effect, not only on the child's physical health, but
on the child's emotional health as well.' 03 Thus, New York's provi-
sion for intervention upon risk of harm to the child's safety closely
follows both the concepts endorsed by the Draft 1°4 and the guidelines
promulgated by the federal government.105
Critics of these approaches argue that they encourage unwar-
ranted intrusion into family privacy. They insist that intervention
based upon actual harm of a serious nature more appropriately de-
lineates the area of state interest.'" Such criticism ignores the goal
of preventing abuse and furthers the view that family autonomy is
more precious than the child's need for protection. One authority ar-
gues that "in the [parent-child] relationship one individuals liberties
and welfare - the child's - are completely subject to the other's
100. N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 1012(e)(i)-(ii) (McKinney 1983).
101. Id. The definition provides in part that an abused child is a child under eighteen
years of age whose parent or other person legally responsible for his welfare:
(i) inflicts or allows to be inflicted upon such child physical injury by other than
accidental means which causes or creates a substantial risk of death, or serious
or protracted disfigurement, or protracted impairment of physical or emotional
health or protracted loss or impairment of the function of any bodily organ, or
(ii) creates or allows to be created a substantial risk of physical injury to such
child by other than accidental means which would be likely to cause death or
serious or protracted disfigurement, or impairment of physical or emotional
health or protracted loss or impairment of the function of any bodily organ.
Id. at § 1012(e)(i)-(ii) (McKinney 1983).
102. Besharov, Supplementary Practice Commentary, in N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT. § 1012
(McKinney 1983) [hereinafter cited as Besharov, Commentary]; Besharov, State Intervention,
supra note 96, at 723.
103. Besharov, Commentary, supra note 103; Besharov, State Intervention, supra note
96, at 723.
104. See supra note 89 and accompanying text.
105. See supra note 86 and accompanying text.
106. See generally McCathren, Accountability in the Child Protection System: A De-
fense of the Proposed Standards Relating to Abuse and Neglect, 57 BUL. REV. 707 (1981).
See also INSTITUTE OF JUDICIAL ADMIN & AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, JOINT COMMISSION
ON JUVENILE JUSTICE STANDARDS, STANDARDS RELATING TO ABUSE AND NEGLECT (1981)
[hereinafter cited as ABA STANDARDS].
governance. Instead of focusing only on the privacy right of the dom-
inant party - the parent - we must consider [that] the child's suc-
cor justifies interference with it."'0 7
4. Colorado's Approach.-Colorado's child abuse reporting
statute specifically enumerates those injuries falling within the pur-
view of the law.108 The statute provides in part that:
(1)(a) "Abuse" or "child abuse or neglect" means an act or
omission in one of the following categories which seriously
threatens the health or welfare of a child:
(I) Any case in which a child exhibits evidence of skin
bruising, bleeding, hematoma, soft tissue swelling, or death, and
such condition or death is not justifiably explained, or where the
history given concerning such condition or death is at variance
with the degree or type of such condition or death, or circum-
stances indicate that such condition or death may not be the
product of an accidental occurrence.1"9
Other states have adopted similar language.110
To the extent that it delineates specific injuries, the Colorado
statute is less ambiguous and subject to fewer variances in applica-
tion than other reporting statutes that are couched in terms of
"harm or threatened harm." Some commentators assert, however,
that such overly-technical, "shopping lists" of injuries frequently re-
sult in the exclusion of injuries not expressly contained in the statute,
but which nevertheless warrant attention."' In fact, such definitions
appear to encompass only the "battered child syndrome," a formula-
tion that certain authorities have criticized as too narrow."'
107. Dembetz, Preventing Youth Crime by Preventing Neglect, 65 A.B.A. J. 920, 923
(1979).
108. COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 19-10-103 to 19-10-116 (Supp. 1984).
109. Id. at § 19-10-103. The definition of abuse in this section is limited to the reporting
of child abuse, and does not apply in proceedings in which a child is alleged to be neglected
and dependent. In re M.A.L., 37 Colo. App. 307, 553 P.2d 103 (1976).
110. See, e.g., IDAHO CODE § 16-1602 (1984) which provides, in pertinent part, as
follows:
(a) "Abused" means any case in which a child has been the victim of:
(I) Conduct or omission resulting in skin bruising, bleeding, malnutrition, burns,
fracture of any bone, subdural hematoma, soft tissue swelling, failure to thrive
or death, and such condition or death is not justifiably explained, or where the
history given concerning such condition or death is at variance with the degree
or type of such condition or death, or the circumstances indicate that such condi-
tion or death may not be the product of an accidental occurrence.
Id.
I 11. See, e.g., Besharov, Legal Aspects of Reporting, supra note 35, at 474 (cautioning,
however, that "generalized definitions risk overbroad applications that include behavior that
should not be considered abusive or neglectful.").
112. See supra notes 31-33 and accompanying text.
B. Pennsylvania's "Serious Physical Injury" Standard
1. The CPSL Language.-Pennsylvania limits the scope of its
child abuse statute to non-accidental "serious" physical injuries. 18
The qualifier "serious" did not appear in Senator O'Pakes' initial
proposal, which defined abuse in terms of gross physical injury. '
By the time the Senate unanimously approved Senate Bill 25 on
April 28, 1975, the standard changed to grave physical injury.'
1 5
Fearing that this standard would encourage unwarranted intrusion
into family matters," 6 the House Health and Welfare Committee
upgraded the level of harm to "serious". 1 7 As enacted, the law re-
tained the amended language.
The CPSL does not define either "serious" or "serious physical
injury," and, until recently, failed to provide any hint as to the pa-
rameters of those terms. However, language added to the law in
1982118 provides some indication of the types of injuries which fall
within the purview of the statute. Section 1519 of the law provides
that child abuse reports and records be made available to:
Law enforcement officials in the course of investigating cases of
(i) homicide, sexual abuse or exploitation, or serious bodily in-
jury as perpetrated by persons whether related or not to the vic-
tim; (ii) child abuse perpetrated by persons who are not family
members or (iii) repeated physical injury to a child under cir-
cumstances which indicate that the child's health or welfare is
harmed or threatened thereby.2 °
Serious bodily injury is further defined as "bodily injury which cre-
ates a substantial risk of death or which causes serious permanent
disfigurement or protracted loss or impairment of the function of any
113. For the entire definition of child abuse, see supra note 62.
114. See Senate Bill 1166, Printer's No. 1974 (PA. SENATE BILLS 1973).
!15. Senate Bill 25, Printer's No. 651 (PA. SENATE BILLS 1975). For the bill's history,
see HISTORY OF SENATE BILLs, A-5 (1975-1976).
116. The "environmental exception" amendment owed its incorporation to the same sen-
timents. Most of the opposition arose as a result of lobbying efforts by various citizens' groups
from the Philadelphia area. State Representatives from Philadelphia proposed the amend-
ments. Telephone interview with Kay Packer, Executive Assistant to Senator O'Pake (Nov. 4,
1984). Spear Interview, supra note 11.
117. See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
118. Act of June 10, 1982, Act No. 1982-136, 1982 PA. LAWS 460 (codified at PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 11, §§ 2201-2224 (Purdon Supp. 1984)).
119. Id. at § 2215.
120. Id. at § 2215(a)(9) (emphasis added). Section 2215(a)(10) further allows reports
to be made available to:
Law enforcement officials who shall receive reports of abuse in which the initial
review gives evidence that the abuse is homicide, sexual abuse or exploitation, or
serious bodily injury perpetrated by persons whether related or not related to the
victim, or child abuse perpetrated by persons who are not family members ...
For purposes of section 15(a), "serious bodily injury" means bodily injury which
creates a substantial risk of death or which causes serious permanent disfigure-
ment or protracted loss or impairment of the function of any bodily organ.
bodily organ."112
This language recognizes that child abuse encompasses varying
degrees of harm. Significantly, it suggests that not all injuries within
the purview of the law are serious. Although the statute indicates
that the definition of serious bodily injury applies "for purposes of
section 15(a)", 22 the entire statute should be read as incorporating
this distinction between grades of injuries. 2
2. Department of Public Welfare Regulations.-The CPSL
directs the Department of Public Welfare (DPW) to implement the
provisions of the law. Through its Office of Children, Youth and
Families (CYF), DPW promulgates regulations interpreting the
CPSL and clarifying certain terms.1 24 DPW regulations currently in
effect define serious physical injury as:
[Ilnjury apparently caused primarily by acts or omissions of a
parent or a person responsible for the child's welfare which sig-
nificantly jeopardizes the child's safety, causes the child severe
pain, significantly impairs the child's physical functioning, either
temporarily or permanently, or is accompanied by physical evi-
dence of a continuous pattern of separate, unexplained injuries
to the child.
1 25
This definition notwithstanding, determinations as to what con-
stitutes serious injury vary greatly.' 26 Several child welfare authori-
ties attribute this variance to the subjective standards by which
caseworkers and hearing officers assess the incidences brought to
their attention. 27 For example, under one branch of DPW's defini-
tion, a serious injury is one which is "accompanied by physical evi-
dence of a continuous pattern of separate unexplained injuries."' 12 8
The Department further defines this standard as requiring medical
evidence of a pattern of injuries, such as fractures of various ages, or
121. Id. Compare id. with OHIO REV. CODE ANN. tit. 29, § 2901.01(H), providing:
'"Substantial risk' means a strong possibility, as contrasted with a remote or significant possi-
bility that a certain result may occur or that certain circumstances may exist." See also supra
note 92.
122. See supra note 121 and accompanying text.
123. See, e.g., I PA. CONS. STAT. § 1922(2) (1975) ("[T]he General Assembly intends
the entire statute to be effective and certain."). See also Habecker v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 299
Pa. Super. 463, 445 A.2d 1222 (1982) (legislature is presumed to intend to avoid mere
surplusage).
124. 1983 REPORT, supra note 57, at 1.
125. DPW SOCIAL SERVICES MANUAL § 2-23-43 (1976). The proposed regulations de-
lete "significantly jeopardized the child's safety" because the language is considered too arbi-
trary. Spear Interview, supra note 11.
126. See supra notes 16, 79 and accompanying text. Accord Spear Interview, supra note
Ii; telephone interview with Mary Curran, CPS Supervisor, Lackawanna County Children
and Youth Services (Oct. 29, 1984); interview with Nancy Kessler, Supervisor, Cumberland
County Children and Youth Services, in Carlisle, PA (Jan. 8, 1985).
127. See supra notes 16, 127 and accompanying text.
128. See supra notes 94, 126 and accompanying text.
burns in various stages of healing. 12 9 Nevertheless, one recent CPS
investigation established a pattern of injuries without the requisite
medical evidence. 130
3. Case Law.-To date, only two judicial decision have inter-
preted "serious physical injury" under the law. Significantly, both
cases underscore the increasing concern for adequate definitions in
parental discipline cases.
In J.H. v. Commonwealth, Department of Public Welfare,'3'
J.H. attempted to physically discipline his eleven year-old stepson
(E.H.) by striking him across the buttocks with an oak stick. When
the child attempted to avoid the blow, J.H. struck him on the head.
The child sustained a laceration which required six sutures. The
CPS filed an indicated report 13 2 of child abuse.
On appeal, J.H. argued that the record was not being main-
tained in accordance with the law because the child's injury was
neither serious nor intentionally inflicted. The Commonwealth Court
rejected both contentions. Citing the DPW definition of serious phys-
ical injury, the court declared that "it is obvious that such a blow,
causing an injury requiring six sutures, will cause severe pain, espe-
cially when administered to an eleven year-old child."1 33 The court
also held that the injury was not accidental, noting that "the record
supports the Hearing Officer's conclusion that J.H. intended to inflict
pain. J.H. was aware of the natural consequences of his action, i.e.,
that it would generate the child's reaction even though not
intentional.'
3 4
Appeal of E.S. 3 5 provides an interesting and significant con-
trast. E.S. attempted to discipline his twelve year-old son by hitting
the child across the buttocks with a belt. When the child moved to
avoid the blow, E.S. struck him on the back. A subsequent medical
examination revealed "a slightly-raised welt in the lower right-hand
portion of [the child's] back. There was no abrasion in the area and
129. Spear Interview, supra note 11.
130. The CPS assigned a status of unfounded to an incident in which a mother "back-
handed" her teen-aged daughter and cut her cheek. Before the completion of the thirty-day
investigation, another altercation ensued. This time the daughter injured her back when her
mother pushed her into a dresser. The report on this incident received a finding of indicated.
While neither injury was serious in and of itself, the CPS determined that together, the two
incidents satisfied the "continuous pattern of injuries" criterion. Kessler Interview, supra note
127.
131. 73 Pa. Commw. 369, 457 A.2d 1346 (1983).
132. See supra note 7.
133. 73 Pa. Commw. at 371, 457 A.2d at 1348. But see In re Taylor, 62 Misc.2d 529,
309 N.Y.S.2d 368 (N.Y. Fain. Ct. 1970) (laceration on back of the head requiring sutures
caused by a rock thrown by defendant was not serious injury).
134. 73 Pa. Commw. at 372, 457 A.2d at 1348.
135. - Pa. Commw. - , 474 A.2d 432 (1984). Compare discussion at supra note
16.
no bleeding. '"1 6 The examining physical filed a report of suspected
child abuse, and the CPS determined that since the injury was seri-
ous, the report was indicated.
On appeal, the Commonwealth Court held that the injury did
not constitute serious physical injury within the meaning of the
CPSL. Applying the DPW criteria for serious injury, the court noted
that the injury did not impair the child's physical functioning, nor
did it jeopardize his safety. The court noted that the injury arose out
of an isolated incident, was unintentionally inflicted, and was not se-
rious. 117 While the physician testified that such a blow could cause
severe pain, the child testified that the spanking did not hurt very
much.
Significantly, the court expressly acknowledged the parental
privilege to discipline children through corporal punishment, pro-
vided that the force used is not designed or known to create a sub-
stantial risk of death, serious bodily injury, disfigurement, extreme
pain, mental distress, or gross degradation. 13 8 Professionals in Penn-
sylvania, however, have become increasingly concerned about the use
of corporate punishment and the extent to which such parental con-
duct is abusive. 139 They are not alone in their concerns. As one au-
thor notes:
Some child abuse authorities insist that hitting the child with
anything other than the hand is abusive action . . . if spanking
is done only with the human hand, a human limit exists to the
force behind it - also a limit to the number of times it happens.
In other words, the hand will begin to sting and burn with the
repeated action, and the spanking will cease. 4"
Other professionals reject state intervention into situations in which
parental discipline poses no threat of severe or permanent damage,""
136. - Pa. Commw. at __ , 474 A.2d at 434.
137. The court's reasoning is circular. It states that the injury was not serious because it
did not jeopardize the child's safety, and did not jeopardize the child's safety because it was
not a serious injury.
138. See, e.g., Boland v. Leska, 308 Pa. Super. 169, 454 A.2d 75 (1982). See also sec-
tion 509 of the Pennsylvania Crimes Code which provides in part that the use of force upon or
toward the person of another is justifiable if:
(1) The actor is the parent or guardian or other person similarly responsible for
the general care and supervision of a minor or a person acting at the request of
such parent, guardian or other responsible person and:
(i) the force is used for the purpose of safeguarding or promoting the wel-
fare of the minor, including the preventing or punishment of his misconduct; and
(ii) the force used is not designed to cause or known to create a substantial
risk of causing death, serious bodily injury, disfigurement, extreme pain or
mental distress or gross degradation.
18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 509(1) (1982).
139. O'Neal Interview, supra note 16.
140. S. O'BRIEN, supra note 22, at 13-14.
141. ABA STANDARDS, supra note 107, at 63.
a position consistent with the decision in Appeal of E.S.142
The requirement of "severe or permanent damage" is too harsh
a standard, not only in the parental discipline cases, but in all cases
arising under the child abuse laws. It ignores the needs of children
who suffer all but the most critical of injuries, and reinforces the
archaic notion that parents have property rights in their children.
IV. Recommendations
The following recommendations address the problems raised in
this comment.
A. Proposed Child Abuse Definition14 s
"Child Abuse means an act or omission of a child's parent, or
other person legally responsible for the child's welfare, or any indi-
vidual residing in the same home as the child, or a paramour of the
child's parent, which results in (1) serious bodily injury, or (2)
mental injury, physical neglect, or repeated physical injury under
circumstances which indicate that the child's health or welfare is
harmed or threatened with harm, and such condition is not justifia-
bly explained, or where the history given concerning such condition
is at variance with the degree or type of such condition, or the cir-
cumstances indicate that such condition may not be the product of
an accidental occurrence, or (3) sexual abuse or exploitation, Pro-
vided that no child shall be deemed physically or mentally abused
for the sole reason he is in good faith being furnished treatment by
spiritual means through prayer alone in accordance with the tenets
and practices of a recognized church or religious denomination by a
duly accredited practitioner thereof or is not provided specific medi-
cal treatment in the practice of religious beliefs, or solely on the
grounds of environmental factors which are beyond the control of the
person responsible for the child's welfare such as inadequate hous-
ing, furnishings, income, clothing and medical care.
"Child" means any child under eighteen years of age.
"Serious bodily injury" means bodily injury which creates a
substantial risk of death or which causes serious permanent disfig-
urement or protracted loss or impairment of the function of any bod-
ily member or organ.
"Substantial risk" means a strong possibility, as contrasted with
a remote possibility, that a certain result may occur, or that certain
circumstances may exist.
142. - Pa. Commw. -, 474 A.2d 432 (1984).
143. Compare the current child abuse definition at supra note 62.
B. Recommendations for DPW
The Department should strive for greater consistency in the in-
terpretation and application of the law. A first step toward achieving
this goal is the development of uniform training for hearing officers
who interpret the CPSL. The Department should also distribute all
hearing officers' opinions to each county CPS. Providing the CPS
staff with concrete applications of the law will guide them in evalu-
ating similar incidents and will focus attention an ill-advised
conclusions.
V. Commentary on Proposed Definition
The proposal effects several changes in the law. First, it defines
child abuse as an act or omission which results in injury, thus elimi-
nating the current requirement that the injury be "caused by the
acts or omissions" of a parent or other caretaker. The proposal re-
quires only that the injury is a consequence of the parental conduct.
Second, the proposal changes "serious physical injury" to "seri-
ous bodily injury," incorporating section 15's definition of that term,
and further defining "substantial risk." Third, the proposal rejects
the law's exclusion of non-serious injuries by employing section 15's
"repeated physical injury" terminology. Both the "serious bodily in-
jury" and the "repeated physical injury" standards in section 15 in-
dicate the legislature's recognition that child abuse encompasses a
range of injuries."" The proposed definition reflects this
appreciation.
Fourth, the proposal requires that in cases of non-serious injury
or neglect, the child's welfare be "harmed or threatened with harm."
This restricts the reach of the law, thus limiting state intervention to
situations which present a clear threat to the child.
Finally, the proposal clarifies the law's proviso that the injury
"is not explained by the available medical history as being acciden-
tal." Under the recommended definition, if the parent fails to justifi-
ably explain the child's condition or provides an account that varies
with the degree or type oft he injury, or if the injury may not be the
result of an accident, then the injury comes within the purview of the
statute.
VI. Conclusion
This implementation of Pennsylvania's Child Protective Services
Law significantly enhanced the State's ability to protect its children.
Deficiencies in the law's treatment of physical injury do not diminish
144. See supra note 121 and accompanying text.
the important strides accomplished to date. Nevertheless, these
problems warrant an improved methodology. Pennsylvania's adop-
tion of the proposed definition will balance the letter of the law with
its spirit. It will encourage consistency in the law's application while
upholding the law's most fundamental aim: the protection of the
state's children.
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